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Abstract: Johan Huizinga’s Homo Ludens (1938) is, in certain circles, still highly 
esteemed as a paradigm of humanist scholarship. Huizinga argues that cultures 
arise and unfold in and as play but that they tend to lose their playfulness as they 
mature. As a gifted writer and erudite philologist, cross-cultural historian, and cul-
ture critic, he made a, at first sight, brilliant case for this intriguing thesis. However, 
a more thorough reading shows that it is unsatisfactory as an explanatory treatise 
about the link between human play and human cultures. It is argued that this striking 
combination of intellectual brilliance and lack of convincing content is symptomatic 
of the lingering crisis in the humanities and that Huizinga’s masterwork thus ex-
cellently exemplifies the need of what will be called soft consilience between the 
humanities and science. It was anathema for Huizinga because of his strong belief 
in the vocational, epistemic, and methodological autonomy of the humanities, but 
any academic treatise on the role of play in human cultures should start out from 
the scientific perspective of the biology of our species and of play.
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1. Introduction: The existential “crisis” in the humanities
In recent years, we have been confronted with multiple reports about a supposedly alarming, nu-
merical, or popular decline of the humanities.1 In reality, the great collapse of enrollment in the hu-
manities happened almost entirely in the 1970s (e.g. Bérubé, 2013; Mateos, 2013), mainly because 
of a remarkable shift in education choices among women (in the late 1960s, more than 20% of the 
degrees they earned were in the humanities, in the 1980s this number had dropped to less than 
10%). In fact, in both the US and the EU, the number of students as a percentage of the entire col-
lege-age population, majoring in disciplines like history, English, or philosophy is greater than it was 
in the 1950s or the 1980s (Silbey, 2013). If there is, indeed, a crisis, it is largely located in the hearts 
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The ultimate rationale of my research concerns 
the ancient project of an integrated science of our 
species, a true “anthropology” or Homo sapiens 
1 as Richerson and Boyd call it in their Not by 
Genes Alone (2006). One of the many obstacles 
that have always stood in the way of realizing 
this project, is the ancient friction between the 
“humanities” and the “sciences.” It is this friction, 
and the associated crisis in the humanities, that 
inspired my analysis of Johan Huizinga’s classic 
and intriguing book Homo Ludens (1938).
PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT
Johan Huizinga’s book Homo Ludens (1938) still 
is an icon of humanist scholarship. The idea that 
we are foremost characterized by our inclination 
to play and that this “instinct” is, in important 
ways, antecedent to the quintessential human 
phenomenon, called culture, is intriguing, to say 
the least. Huizinga’s elaboration of this idea is, 
furthermore, in more than one way, intellectually 
attractive. However, it at the same time also is 
seriously flawed as an explanatory treatise and 
therefore fails to convince the modern, critical 
reader. It is a dichotomy that is symptomatic of a 
lingering existential crisis in the humanities.
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and minds of humanists: it is existential, rather than numerical. Many humanists feel that their sta-
tus is deflating, compared with that of their scientific colleagues and some even have nagging 
doubts about their mission and raison d’être in modern research universities.
It is a profound malaise that goes back several decades (Arndt, 2006; Rosen, 2014). In 1999, 
Robert Weisbuch lamented, in an essay that proposed six ideas “to revive the humanities,” that hu-
manists had lost the respect of their colleagues in other fields, “as well as the attention of an intel-
ligent public. The action is elsewhere. We’re living through a time when outrage with the newfangled 
in the humanities—with deconstruction or Marxism or whatever—has become plain lack of interest. 
No one’s even angry with us now, just bored” (Weisbuch, 1999, p. B4; my italics). There can be dis-
cerned three kinds of reactions to the realization or idea that “the action is elsewhere.” Some hu-
manists (e.g. Kronman, 2007) have questioned the (epistemological) relevance or moral credentials 
and desirability of the scientific action (cf. the science wars; hence also some of the “newfangled” 
initiatives in the humanities, see Arndt, 2006). Many scholars emphasize the relevance and impor-
tance of the traditional humanities: they argue that the humanities simply have different (ethical, 
political, spiritual, fun) ultimate vocations from the sciences and that humanists should reevaluate 
these vocations and revamp the humanities curriculum accordingly (see, e.g. Arndt, 2006; Else, 
1969; Kronman, 2007 and many of the contributions to Soeiro & Tavares, 2012).2 Lastly, there are 
also people who believe that the humanities should join (strong consilience) or at least try to benefit 
from (soft consilience) the scientific “action” (aims, methodologies and theories). Far from clinging 
to their original and possibly outdated vocations, the humanities should, according to these scholars 
and scientists, “adapt themselves to the needs of a society dominated by science and technology or 
retreat in social triviality” (Plumb, 1964, p. 8).
This last approach does not seem to be the most self-evident, in light of the centuries old chasm 
between science and the humanities (Bouterse & Karstens, 2015; Snow, 1959; Wallerstein & Lee, 
2004). However, it should be pointed out that both cultures have, at the same time, always influ-
enced each other. Without the highly innovative Renaissance humanists, the Scientific Revolution 
would even never have taken place. “It is,” as the British historian John Henry (2008, p. 17) puts it, 
“chiefly through the reformist ideas of the humanists (…) that we arrive at the origins of the Scientific 
Revolution.” Seen this way, the plea for more vocational, methodological, and/or epistemic consil-
ience between science and the humanities is not as utopian as it may seem but rather fits into a 
historical pattern.
Steven Pinker is one of the most vocal proponents of this consilience option. In a much-noted ar-
ticle entitled “Science is not your enemy” (2013), he argues that various forms of consilience with 
science offer the humanities countless possibilities for much needed innovation in “understanding.”3 
It is in the light of this plea for more consilience that I would like to discuss one of the classic works 
in the humanities: Johan Huizinga’s Homo Ludens: Proeve eener Bepaling van het Spel-element der 
Cultuur (1938) (Huizinga, 1949, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture). It is generally 
considered to be one of his masterpieces (Section 2). Huizinga, indisputably a giant among 20th 
century humanists, was a strong believer in, and advocate of, the autonomy of the humanities vis à 
vis the sciences. Homo Ludens was, as we shall see, in at least some respects, a clear exponent of 
this defiant attitude (Section 3). It is also this strictly humanist nature of Homo Ludens that helps to 
explain why it has been severely criticized as an analysis of the role of play in cultures (Section 4). It 
will be tentatively suggested that a credible humanist treatise on human play and human cultures 
should, in at least some respects, be consilient with the science and, particularly, the biology of play 
(Section 5). It is in this sense that Homo Ludens can be interpreted as testifying to the said existential 
crisis in the humanities and that it exemplifies the need of forms of consilience of the humanities 
with science. An uncompromisingly humanist treatise like Homo Ludens certainly has its intellectual 
charms. It is, without a shadow of a doubt, an impressive intellectual tour de force. However, unfor-
tunately or not, in “a society dominated by science and technology,” it smacks, to many, both inside 
and outside academia, of frivolous triviality.
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2. A masterpiece
Born in Groningen, the Netherlands, in 1872, Huizinga was educated as a linguist and Orientalist. 
After taking his degree in 1896 in comparative philology (on a Sanskrit subject), he started teaching 
history at a high school in Haarlem. In 1905, he became Professor of Dutch History and of History of 
the Middle Ages and Modern Times at Groningen University. In 1915, he was appointed Professor of 
General History at Leiden University. However, Huizinga earned (most of) his spurs as a practitioner 
of cultural history. His best work is furthermore characterized by high literary quality and “expressive 
capacity” (Hugenholtz, 1979). Logher (1947) speaks of a meeting and sometimes uncomfortable 
cohabitation, in Huizinga, of an accurate philologist-historian and an artist.4 Kossmann (1973, p. 368) 
refers to several scholars who detected a number of inner contrasts in Huizinga that “can be reduced 
to a common denominator, the fundamental antithesis in Huizinga’s nature being the conflict be-
tween his artistic genius and his rational scholarship.” The Dutch polyglot also always succeeded in 
seamlessly drawing together several of the different subjects that drew his interest: art (in particular 
the visual arts), ethnography, Orientalism, linguistics, philology, history, the theory and philosophy of 
history, and culture theory and criticism. Willem Otterspeer, a historian of universities at Leiden 
University and author of an engaging intellectual biography on Huizinga (Reading Huizinga, 2010), 
depicts Huizinga’s intellectual development as a series of pupations: “A close look shows how natu-
rally the philologist emerged from the linguist, the historian from the philologist, the cultural critic 
from the historian. An attentive eye will see that the critic was latent in the linguist, and that the 
historian always remained a philologist” (2009, pp. 41–42).
It was this hybrid or “fluid” scholar-artist, cultural historian and humanist par excellence, who 
wrote Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen (1919) (1924, The Waning of the Middle Ages), the work that estab-
lished his reputation.5 However, it is probably Homo Ludens, that “strange” and “difficult” book 
(Gombrich, 1973, pp. 277–278), that should be considered Huizinga’s magnum opus, rather than The 
Waning of the Middle Ages. It is, of course, to begin with, a very ambitious work in that it aims at 
showing that play is “older than culture” (1955, p. 1) and therefore foundational to culture. It is also 
only in Homo Ludens that we see the full breadth of Huizinga’s multidisciplinary eruditeness.6,7 
Otterspeer (2010, p. 49) states that Homo Ludens “encompasses virtually all themes of his work. It 
not only provides the context and framework, as it were, for his cultural-historical studies of the 
Middle Ages and the modern era, but it also revisits his earliest work in linguistics, on the need to 
construe language and culture as an integrated whole.”
Norman Cantor (1991, p. 378), the noted Canadian-American medievalist, rightly called it 
Huizinga’s most ambitious work. The philologist in the Dutch scholar examines how the activity that 
we call play has been conceptualized in various languages and continuously refers to play terms and 
phrases in at least half a dozen languages, from pantun (Malay) to gelp, gelpan (Old-German); the 
ethnographer in him talks about the Native American potlatch, the Melanesian kula and the Arabic 
monafara and mofakhara; the historian refers to the famous Combat des Trente (1351) and the ago-
nistic element in the medieval problem of the universals; the art lover Huizinga dedicates an entire 
chapter to the play element in various forms of art; and the culture critic laments that the playful 
element in Western cultures has, since the 18th century, lost much of its significance.
3. An uncompromisingly humanist treatise
Homo Ludens may be an extremely erudite and impressively multidisciplinary treatise, it is also, 
epistemically, methodologically and vocationally, a strictly humanist and non- or even anti-scientific 
analysis of the relationship between play and human cultures. The aforementioned, Austrian-born 
art historian Sir Ernst Hans Josef Gombrich (1973, p. 292) reproaches Huizinga for using an essential-
ist definition of “play” (even though he was a professed anti-essentialist), which he opposes to a 
more scientific, nominalist approach. Biologists are indeed more flexible about the concept, but 
merely because it has proven impossible to define.8 The real problem with Huizinga’s definition of 
play is in my opinion not that it is “essentialist” but that it completely and explicitly ignores the bio-
logical roots and nature of human play. In the preface, Huizinga explains that the aim of Homo 
Ludens is to try to integrate the concept of play into that of culture. “Consequently, play is to be 
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understood here not as a biological phenomenon but as a cultural phenomenon. It is approached 
historically, not scientifically.” In the first chapter, “Nature and significance of play as a cultural phe-
nomenon,” the biology of play is again explicitly excluded: play only interests him in as far as it is a 
strictly cultural as opposed to biological phenomenon.9
Whence this aversion for biology?10 In an intellectual autobiography (1947), Huizinga admitted 
that he was himself surprised, while contemplating his youth years, by his almost total lack of inter-
est, not only in philosophical and mathematical subjects, but also in the natural sciences, despite the 
fact that he had plenty of friends who were enthralled by biologists like Haeckel and Büchner or 
physicists like Lorenz and Maxwell and even though his own father was a talented professor of physi-
ology. However, there is more to Huizinga’s reluctance to take into account the biological roots of 
play than personal interests and talents. He was not an economist either, but that did not prevent 
him from discussing, in chapter 20 of In the Shadow of Tomorrow (1936), the relationship between 
the spiritual crisis that is the subject of this book and the socio-economic relations of his time.11 So 
why then did Huizinga not consider it necessary to deal with the biology of play in a book about hu-
man play?
The answer, in short, is that he believed that human play was intrinsically not a biological phenom-
enon. Biological interpretations allegedly all started out from the (mistaken) assumption that play 
must have some kind of biological purpose. They did, in Huizinga’s humanist opinion, not pay enough 
attention to the subjective meaning that play has for players and to the profoundly esthetic quality or 
beauty of play.12 They did not explain why the baby crows with pleasure or why the gambler loses 
herself in her passion. Nature could just as easily have given her children the biological functions that 
play fulfills in the form of purely mechanical exercises. “But no, she gave us play, with its tension, its 
mirth, and its fun” (1955, p. 3). This intensity of play “finds no explanation in biological analysis” 
(p. 2).13 Huizinga believed that it is precisely in this intensity that the very essence and the primordial 
quality of play lies. It is, in short, foremost a mental phenomenon. In acknowledging play, one ac-
knowledges mind, “for whatever else play is, it is not matter” (p. 3). And because play is a “mind 
phenomenon,” it is a topic for the humanities (“geesteswetenschappen”), not for the natural 
 sciences.14 Huizinga furthermore asserted that play only became possible when an influx of mind 
broke down the absolute determinism of the cosmos. “The very existence of play continually confirms 
the supra-logical nature of the human situation. (…) In tackling the problem of play as a function of 
culture proper and not as it appears in the life of the animal or the child, we begin where biology and 
psychology leave off” (pp. 3–4, my italics). In private notes, he even wrote: “the goal is not to describe 
all forms of play, only there where it passes into culture” (cited in Van der Lem, 1993, p. 252).
I believe that this short note betrays the real or ultimate reason why Huizinga describes play as a 
non-biological “mind phenomenon”: it was, more than anything else, his insistence on the sharp 
(epistemic, methodological, and vocational) distinction between the humanities and the natural sci-
ences or culture and nature that inspired his humanist and restricted definition of play as a “mind 
phenomenon.” This definition was subsequently, in a perfectly circular way, used to argue that play 
is a topic for the humanities, and not for the natural sciences. The ancient, humanist separation 
between the study of nature and that of humanity was indeed a crucial element in Huizinga’s think-
ing. In an inaugural address as Professor of History at the University of Groningen (Huizinga, 1905), 
he already sided with the likes of Wilhelm Dilthey, Georg Simmel, Wilhelm Windelband, and Heinrich 
Rickert who had opposed Karl Lamprecht’s positivism and vindicated the right of history to an au-
tonomous method, separate from the mechanistic natural sciences.15 The “understanding” of the 
humanities was said to differ from the more nomothetic—i.e. oriented toward the establishment of 
general laws—modes of inquiry of the natural sciences in the particular attention that they offer to 
subjective and idiographic experiences and to meaning, purpose, and self-reflection as opposed to 
empirical “truths.”16 The humanities’ methodology therefore had to be historical, hermeneutic, or 
interpretative and even speculative (“narrative imagination”), rather than experimental and quanti-
tative (cf. Dilthey’s terminological distinction between interpretative “Geisteswissenschaften” and 
explanatory “Naturwissenschaften”).
Page 5 of 15
Tanghe, Cogent Arts & Humanities (2016), 3: 1245087
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2016.1245087
Like these scholars, Huizinga opposed the positivist ideal of general, objective laws that rigidly 
govern a mechanistically conceived nature or reality. In the aforementioned autobiography (1947), 
he speaks of the incontrovertible vindication of the mind and culture sciences from the spell of a 
self-assured scientific evolutionism and of a restoration of the equivalent autonomy of the humani-
ties. It was precisely the particular that was the subject of the historiography that he practiced and 
subjectivity was inevitable or even the only meaningful reality (cf. his definition of play as a “mental 
phenomenon”). In a lecture, given in 1926 to the general assembly of the “Historical Genootschap” 
(Huizinga, 1950), he observed that the idea of the autonomous humanities (“geesteswetenschap-
pen”) had, since Rickert published his Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung (1896–
1902), only become stronger. Practicing historians were, nevertheless, strongly influenced by the 
scientific thinking of their colleagues. He referred in this respect to the idea of development. Once it 
had become clothed in the guise of evolution, it was, for historians, almost impossible not to become 
infected by this powerful notion. Huizinga, by contrast, pointed out that a historical phenomenon 
was profoundly different from an organism. The latter is sharply delineated from its environment 
whereas a historical phenomenon is not: “closed” historical “organisms” do not exist. Napoleon, for 
example, can only be understood as a child of his time. Also, historical changes are not comparable 
to evolutionary changes because they are much less internally determined.17
It is abundantly clear that this methodological dimension of the humanities’ autonomy was im-
portant to Huizinga. However, I believe that the most important way in which Homo Ludens was 
conceived as a non-scientific and humanist treatise was not methodological but rather vocational: 
it seems to me that Huizinga did not at all aim at critically or objectively investigating the roles that 
play may or may not fulfill in human cultures, or at contributing to such an investigation with a fal-
sifiable hypothesis. He rather aimed at developing an erudite and intellectually charming, humanist 
narrative around certain preconceived ideas about the nature of play and the role it plays in human 
cultures.18 We already know one of these preconceptions: play lies at the origin of culture. We will 
shortly (Section 4) see, though, that this was not Huizinga’s ultimate or most profound preconcep-
tion regarding the nature of the relationship between play and human cultures.
Huizinga’s exclusive interest in play as a cultural and formal phenomenon must, lastly and para-
doxically, also be seen in light of the biologically inspired historiographical morphology (and physiol-
ogy) that he, in the late 1920s, intended to elaborate (see Krul, 1990, ch. 6).19 Small formal units (e.g. 
myths, sacred acts, sanctification, and secret societies) and functions (e.g. honor, resistance and 
servitude) that are, both synchronically and diachronically, culturally stable or constant were to be-
come the focal points of a cultural historiography. Homo Ludens is the only result of this project. It 
can, as Krul (1990, p. 238) puts it, be considered a study of one particular though also all-pervasive 
and irreducible cultural form: play. In a similar vein, Gombrich (1973) points out that play had be-
come to Huizinga what Goethe would have called an Urphänomen and that this is the reason why 
Homo Ludens offers so few answers. Goethe, he says, had used this strategy to preserve his notion 
of color from the analysis of Newtonian optics.
Huizinga withdrew into a similar fortress to ward off the onslaught of psychology and the 
study of animal behaviour. It is for this reason, I believe, that Homo ludens raises so many 
questions and offers so few answers. The notion of play as an irreducible fact could not but 
rule out any attempts at explanation. I hope to have shown that Huizinga was consistent in 
adopting this attitude, and it can certainly not be the purpose of this paper to enter into the 
vast range of problems he so deliberately excluded. (Gombrich, 1973, p. 192)
4. Flawed as an explanatory treatise
This brings me to the credibility of Huizinga’s analysis. It may not (primarily) have been conceived as 
a truly or objectively explanatory treatise, but that is, inevitably, how it was and is perceived. 
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Unfortunately, seen from this explanatory angle, Homo Ludens all of a sudden does not look like a 
magnum opus anymore. Gombrich is certainly not the only scholar who has put its explanatory cre-
dentials in serious doubt. Logher (1947, p. 102), for example, likewise remarks that Homo Ludens 
does not satisfy the reader because he treats play as a purely formal phenomenon whereas our 
mind also longs for content.20 That content can, as we shall see (Section 5), ultimately only be  derived 
from biology since human play is at least as deeply rooted in our biological nature and in the animal 
kingdom, as human cultures are in play. A thorough understanding of the role of play in human 
cultures therefore requires, in sharp contrast with what Huizinga claimed, that we also have a good 
grasp of its biological and adaptive significance (cf. Goldschmidt, 2007). Or, as the biologist Burghardt 
(2006, p. 5) puts it: “It is unrealistic to think we can truly understand human play without under-
standing the play of dogs, monkeys, and turtles (…).” In the following three subsections, I will first 
discuss three important flaws in Huizinga’s analysis.
4.1. A “ludicrous” contradiction
The motivating energy behind Homo Ludens was “a recognition that something had gone terribly 
wrong with the element of play in culture, and that this ‘something’ was connected to the rise of mass 
movements and totalitarian regimes, and to a profound cultural crisis (…)” (Thomassen, 2014, p. 146).21 
This contemporaneous pessimism fed into, reinforced or confirmed Huizinga’s romantically inspired 
historical pessimism (even though he called himself, in the preface to In the Shadow of Tomorrow, an 
optimist), something which undoubtedly partly explains the lasting and somewhat enigmatic appeal 
of the Dutch scholar (cf. his often criticized idealizing of the past, see Geyl, 1961).22 In his The Idea of 
Decline in Western History (1997, p. 80), the American historian Arthur L. Herman defines the histori-
cal pessimist as someone who “sees the present as systematically undoing the achievements of a 
creative and ordered past.” Jakob Burckhardt, the influential Swiss historian of art and culture whom 
Huizinga held in high esteem, for example, believed, like Huizinga, that high culture and creativity 
had become debased in our modern world where “money becomes and remains the great measure 
of things, [and] poverty the greatest vice” (cited in Herman, 1997, p. 88). The Middle Ages, by con-
trast, for all their faults, had been “without (…) threatening national wars, without forced mass in-
dustry with deadly competition, without credit and capitalism” (cited in ibid.). In short: “Our life is a 
business, theirs was living” (cited in ibid.). Burckhardt’s historical pessimism “sprang from a view of 
society that he inherited from Ranke, the view that it is a complete and organic whole that must 
eventually face decline and death just as any living organism does” (Herman, 1997, p. 106). The or-
ganic principle or metaphor was one of the hallmarks of Romanticism (e.g. Peckham, 1951); whereas 
the machine metaphor was of course central to the advent and development of modern science. 
Modern science was, more in general, forward looking and inspired by the idea of progress, whereas 
medieval philosophy and classical, Renaissance humanism were, at bottom, pessimistic and back-
ward-looking endeavors: “The classical humanist recovered the literature and the monuments of 
classical antiquity with a sense of return to the pure gold of a civilization better and higher than his 
own” (Yates, 1964, p. 1). And: “the overall orientation toward the past that marked humanist thought 
no less than that of the scholastics was not conducive to science taken as a search for discovery 
rather than for recovery” (Cohen, 1994, p. 273).
This romantic pessimism clearly also inspired Huizinga’s analysis of play and of cultural history in 
general. His ultimate and, granted, magnificently accomplished (humanist) aim was to esthetically 
express a romantic cultural pessimism and to eruditely ventilate all too warranted political worries. 
This may explain or help explain why so much praise was heaped upon a book that, as an explana-
tory theory about the role of play in cultures, was deeply unsatisfying: it struck a moral and esthetic 
nerve. A central element in his story is that a culture tends to lose its original, fresh playfulness as it 
“matures.” The “play-element gradually recedes into the background” and ultimately becomes “al-
most completely hidden behind cultural phenomena” (Huizinga, 1955, pp. 46–47). Huizinga assumes 
that cultures spring forth from play, much like human beings develop physiologically and cognitively 
through play (the organic metaphor). Once mature, they become, like adults, less playful. The 19th 
century lost many of the play-elements “so characteristic of former ages” (1955, p. 195). Play lost its 
significance in almost all cultural domains where once it ruled supreme. The 20th century, dissected 
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in the last chapter, was even worse: “civilization is no longer played, and even where it still seems to 
play, it is false play (…)” (p. 206). This chapter reads as an indictment of modern times. Indeed, 
Gombrich (1973, p. 277) advises the reader of Homo Ludens “to start with the last chapter and work 
their way backward. It is in the last chapter that Huizinga reveals what his problem really is and why 
he undertook the labour of surveying so large and diverse a field for manifestations of play.”
Play, Huizinga laments, has, in the 20th century, in many instances degenerated into a blend of 
adolescence and barbarism. In The Shadow of Tomorrow (1936), this toxic cultural amalgamation 
had been called “puerilism.” It concerned habits that are as old as the world but that had become 
more prevalent and brutal in Huizinga’s time. Puerilism could be studied most thoroughly in all its 
aspects in America and was characterized by a mixing of the sphere of play and the sphere of serious 
activity. In apparently serious activities, like politics, hid an element of play (political games), while 
true play was being taken too seriously and had become technically overorganized. In Homo Ludens 
he refers in particular to the habit of gregariousness: “It results in puerilism of the lowest order: yells 
or other signs of greeting, the wearing of badges and sundry items of political haberdashery, walking 
in marching order or at a special pace and the whole rigmarole of collective voodoo and mumbo-
jumbo” (1955, p. 205). At a slightly deeper psychological level, puerilism manifests itself “in the insa-
tiable thirst for trivial recreation and crude sensationalism, the delight in mass-meetings, 
mass-demonstrations, parades, etc.” (ibid.).
Geyl (1963, p. 262) has said of Homo Ludens that Huizinga’s “obsession with decline and ruin and 
the rancor against his own time had taken complete control.” Therefore, Homo Ludens should be 
considered a “brilliant, but wrong-headed improvisation” (p. 261). Huizinga’s entire argument 
“seems to have served no other purpose (…) than to pronounce once more the verdict of guilty over 
present day civilization which has allowed play to degenerate in puerilism” (p. 239, my italics). That is 
precisely what I meant when I pointed out that Huizinga did not at all aim at critically investigating 
the roles that play may or may not fulfill in human cultures, or at contributing to such an investiga-
tion with a testable and falsifiable hypothesis but that he rather aimed at developing an erudite and 
intellectually charming, humanist narrative around certain preconceived ideas about the nature of 
play and the role it plays in human cultures. This is maybe also the reason why he made light of a 
grave paradox in his narrative: for a scientific hypothesis, it would have been fatal (internal consistency 
is one of the main scientific “values”), but in a humanist treatise like Homo Ludens, it could easily be 
brushed aside. “The paradox is that Huizinga says (…) play contributes to the transition from savage 
to civilization but that, as civilization proceeds, play becomes increasingly professional and therefore 
doesn’t contribute to civilization, a contradiction that some have found ludicrous” (Sutton-Smith, 
1997, p. 136). It is maybe, more particularly, the “solution” that Huizinga introduced to “solve” that 
contradiction that is ludicrous. In order to “explain” how the mixing of play and non-play did not 
have culture-generating effects anymore in “mature” civilizations, he introduced, as we just saw, the 
completely ad hoc notion of “false play”: “civilization is no longer played, and even where it still 
seems to play, it is false play (…)” (1955, p. 206) and “if our modern puerilism were genuine play we 
ought to see civilization returning to the great archaic forms of recreation where ritual, style and 
dignity are in perfect unison” (ibid.). How can something that one does for fun or primarily for fun be 
“false” or not genuine, i.e. something that one does not for fun?
4.2. Nothing but a truism
Central to Huizinga’s formal and humanist definition of play is the notion that it is free and not “or-
dinary” or “real” life, i.e. it does not belong to the sphere of behaviors which must be performed to, 
directly or indirectly, fulfill physiological needs (fully functional “normal” or “ethotypic” behavior). “It 
is rather a stepping out of ‘real’ life into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all of its 
own” (Huizinga, 1955, p. 8); play is something that is “superfluous,” can “be deferred or suspended 
at any time,” is “done at leisure, during free time” (ibid.) and also “has a tendency to be beautiful” (p. 
10). Play may be serious, but it is not real or for real. As Freud (1959, p. 174) put it: “The antithesis of 
play is reality, not seriousness.” This leads to the question how something that is as frivolous as play 
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can be antecedent to a culture in any significant meaning of the word. In many ways, cultures are 
not very play-like at all. Plowing was an important cultural invention, but a farmer, plowing his field, 
is not playing. Manners, which are deeply ingrained in our lives, have been described as being “so 
important that they should be up there with fire and the invention of language as a prime candidate 
for what makes us human” (Curtis, 2013, p. 28) but they do, in se, not constitute a form of play (al-
though they can become the subject of playful behavior). Others facets of cultures seem even more 
difficult to integrate in the concept of play, least of all, of course, sinister phenomena like wars and 
genocide.
Huizinga, however, was not bothered by this paradox either because of his peculiar and humanist 
(but implicit) definition of “culture”: he tended to largely identify culture with playful or “high” cul-
ture, i.e. the set of cultural products, mainly in the arts, held in the highest esteem by a society. In 
Geschonden Wereld (1946, p. 25), he states that our perception of culture will above all “associate 
itself with aesthetic accomplishments, with the fruits of the arts (…).” This elitist and esthetic percep-
tion of culture is also reflected in Homo Ludens as he discusses predominantly esthetic and intel-
lectual “accomplishments”: poetry, myth-making, philosophy, wisdom, and the arts.23 Even war 
(chapter v) is narrowed down to “noble,” playful or play-like forms of violence, like the ancient trial 
by battle (boxing is a modern example of such playful violence): Huizinga clearly discusses the play 
element in war, rather than the play element of war.24 In short: culture was, to him (in particular in 
its original phases), playful, mainly because of the simple reason that he equates culture with play 
culture and largely ignores the non-playful part of cultures. The claim that culture “arises and unfolds 
in and as play” is therefore, in a way, nothing but a truism: to the extent that culture is implicitly re-
stricted to play culture, it is self-evident that it arises and unfolds in and as play. This truism too, would 
be fatal for a serious scientific analysis of the role of play in human cultures, but it is largely irrelevant 
or certainly less painful within the confines of a humanist treatise.
4.3. Is contest the human form of play par excellence?
One of the most common criticisms of Homo Ludens is that Huizinga puts too much emphasis on one 
particular form of human play: contests. He believed that contests (“agon”) were the form par excel-
lence of play. Homo Ludens might, in fact, as well have been called Homo Agonalis. In Homo Ludens 
(the original, Dutch edition), he wrote: “Play is a contest about something or a demonstration of 
something” (1938, p. 41).25 This focus on agonistic play can be traced back to Hermann Usener’s 
“Heilige Handlung” (1904).26 However, it was probably foremost inspired by another humanist clas-
sic: Burckhardt’s Griechische Kulturgeschichte (1898–1902). It is in this famous characterization of 
the flowering of Greek culture of the fifth century that Burckhardt used the word “agonal.” He 
showed that agonistic play penetrated the whole of Greek life, from the sports and arts to lawsuits 
and philosophical dialogs. He also believed that the cult of the agon was something peculiarly Greek. 
However, this did not bother Huizinga as Burckhardt’s theory was developed “before any general 
sociology existed to digest all the ethnological and anthropological data, most of which (…) were 
only coming to light then” (Huizinga, 1955, pp. 71–72). Huizinga believed that these data amply 
showed that not only Greek culture of the fifth century before Christ was agonistic, but human cul-
ture in general.
Classic Greek culture clearly was, to Huizinga, the paradigm of a play culture: Hellenic society was 
“profoundly imbued with the play-spirit (…)” (Huizinga, 1955, p. 144). Nagel (1998, p. 22) calls this 
“uncritical embrace of Hellenic ‘civilization’” “a bit bewildering.” It would be bewildering in a scien-
tific treatise, but it is much less so in a humanist narrative. Agonistic activities and the associated 
competitive spirit indeed dominated the whole of Greek (aristocratic) life but, dixit another critic, the 
Dutch ancient historian Hendrik Bolkestein, “All this has nothing to do with play—unless one would 
assert that the whole of life would be play for the Greeks” (cited in Huizinga, 1955, p. 30). In a similar 
vein, the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze called agonistic play “bad play” as it has goals and rules 
and, in particular, losers and winners. Real play does not have losers and winners (I will come back 
to this distinction in the next section).
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Other scholars did not criticize Huizinga’s paradigmatic embrace of Hellenic civilization or oppose 
the inclusion of agonistic activities in the play category but criticized their central place in Huizinga’s 
story. Burghardt (2006, p. 393) speaks of the (questionable) “truth” of Huizinga: “civilization is built 
on violent play (…).” Brian Sutton-Smith (1997, pp. 79–80), the renown play theorist who spent his 
entire career attempting to discover the cultural significance of human play, called Huizinga’s thesis 
“a particularly agonistic and machismo view of play history. The definition of play primarily as con-
test reflects the widespread male rhetoric that favors the exaltation of combative power instead of 
speaking comprehensively about play itself. Combat may be widespread but it is hardly a universal 
truth about all play forms.”27 Henricks (2008, p. 160) defines Huizinga’s thesis as the idea “that public 
competitions between socially prominent individuals and groups both defined the spirit of historical 
periods and also led to cultural change and refinement (…).” Huizinga’s work, he observes, “focuses 
almost exclusively on the role of the social contest (or agon) in European history rather than on the 
many other forms of play” (p. 159) (see, e.g. also Gombrich, 1973, p. 288). This restrictive focus 
would, again (like his focus on Greek culture), seriously undermine the credibility of a scientific study 
of human play but it is, or certainly seems, more acceptable or even warranted in a humanist trea-
tise with its own, specific, non-scientific aims.
5. The biological roots of human play
In 2007, the Dutch biologist and writer Tijs Goldschmidt discussed, in the prestigious Huizinga lec-
ture, annually organized by the newspaper NRC Handelsblad, the Faculty of Humanities of Leiden 
University, and the Maatschappij der Nederlandse Letterkunde (Society of Dutch Literature), the bio-
logical component of human play. The dimension that, as he pointed out, Huizinga had neglected in 
Homo Ludens, even though he fully realized that animals also play and that play has biological roots 
(Goldschmidt, 2007). Goldschmidt believed that it was all important and that it might, more particu-
larly, be very worthwhile to reconsider the play phenomena that Huizinga discussed with the help of 
Darwin’s theory of sexual selection. He deplored, more in general, that the distinction between man 
and nature is still with us today. Philosophers and other students of our species keep assuming all 
too readily that we, because of our high intelligence, have become somehow detached from our bio-
logical roots. In reality, we remain, first and foremost, a biological creature. We will therefore never 
fully understand the origin and function of culture, including the role of the play element in it, as long 
as scholars ignore our biological roots or consider them as irrelevant.
I couldn’t agree more. A humanist treatise about the relationship between play and human cul-
tures may be erudite, multidisciplinary, idiographic (as opposed to nomothetic), and focus on the 
mental dimension of this behavior (cf. note 12). It does not even have to (foremost) aim at contribut-
ing to the scientific study of the diachronic relationship between play and human cultures (that 
would constitute strong consilience). However, it should not define human play as an exclusively 
mental phenomenon and subsequently argue that it is a topic for the “geisteswissenshaften” or 
humanities. Nor can such a treatise neglect or make light over internal inconsistencies and truisms. 
It can, last but not least, also not ignore what science and particularly biology has to tell about our 
species and about human play. It should, on the contrary, build upon these biological foundations 
(i.e. be epistemically consilient with science). Let me, in the remainder of this section, tentatively 
(and definitely non-exhaustively) sketch a number of ways in which the biology of our species and of 
play might contribute to the central topic of Homo Ludens and, in particular, what it can tell us about 
the three identified flaws in Huizinga’s story.
If our species indeed is the playing species par excellence, it is probably at least partly due to the 
neotenization or juvenilization process that we underwent: we are, as Stephen Jay Gould (1980) put 
it, like Mickey Mouse, we never grow up.28 Play, curiosity, behavioral flexibility, and “neophilia” (dixit 
Desmond Morris), are all neotenous features. Stuart Brown (2010, p. 58), an American psychiatrist 
and play scientist, certainly believes that it is our neoteny and associated playfulness which “has 
allowed us to come down out of the trees and live anywhere on the planet. We are designed by na-
ture and evolution to continue playing throughout life. Lifelong play is central to our continued 
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well-being, adaptation, and social cohesiveness. Neoteny has fostered civilizations, the arts, and 
music. While neoteny has its drawbacks, it’s simply how we are built.”
Not only are we, as a neotenous species, provided with an exceptionally strong play instinct, that 
instinct can also express itself in a wide variety of behaviors, due to what has been called “cognitive 
fluidity” (Mithen, 1998): the multifactorial ability to combine sometimes very different thoughts, 
ontological domains or behaviors in new ways (it is visualized in great art like the Lion Man of 
Hohlenstein or the bewildering paintings of Huizinga’s compatriot Jheronimus Bosch). It allows the 
human play instinct to “infect” and “infiltrate” almost any other human behavior, ranging from 
erotic behavior and courtesy to aggression (sadism) and physical activities.29 Human play is further-
more also strongly influenced and facilitated by our highly developed theory of mind and by our 
capacity for symbolic thought and foresight.30 The latter capacity allows us to look ahead in the fu-
ture and be curious about what will happen, a curiosity which plays a crucial role in the appeal of 
contests (hence also another common human game: gambling). Our theory of mind, i.e. our excep-
tional ability to transpose ourselves in the mind of other beings, or even to ascribe a mind and goals 
to mindless things like dolls or cars, makes it possible for human beings to passively enjoy literature, 
theatre and cinema. It also is instrumental in the passive enjoyment of sports as it allows us to iden-
tify with an athlete or a team.31 Needless to say, this array of “fluid” forms of play was, because of 
his restrictive (formal) and a-scientific (humanist) interpretation of this phenomenon, not recog-
nized as such (or as “real” play) by Huizinga.
The biology of play also does not support his historical pessimism: there are no reasons to expect that 
(true) play will weaken and dwindle away (or become “false”) as a culture matures (cf. Section 4.1). On 
the contrary, the Surplus Resource Theory (Burghardt, 2006; Pellegrini, 2009; Spencer, 1872) predicts 
that play, including human play, will become more prevalent as resources become more plentiful. 
Play is, in sharp contrast with Huizinga’s central claim, probably more omnipresent in the modern 
Western world than it has ever been in human history.
One of the main biological functions of play is that it fosters (cultural) innovation (Fagen, 1981). 
Pellegrini, Dupuis, and Smith (2007, p. 266) put it thus: “When faced with a relatively novel or uncer-
tain, but safe, environment, play affords opportunities for behavioral and cognitive innovation and 
subsequent practice of newly developed behaviors and strategies (…).” Play is sometimes compared 
with the variability seen in genetic systems and even with variability, generated by the cosmos 
(Brown, 2010, pp. 44–45). Brown (2010, p. 200) probably exaggerates when he claims that “the abil-
ity to innovate largely comes out of an ability to play.” However, it is undoubtedly true that playful-
ness is important to inventors, scientists, and other innovators. Cognitive play and creativity have 
one thing in common: divergent (innovative) thinking. Play has been found to foster divergent think-
ing (Russ, 2003). It may have been instrumental in the evolution of language and the invention of 
cultural hallmarks like the mastery of fire, cooking and the wheel. One might therefore say that 
culture is play or that it is generated through play. Put differently, the claim that cultures arise and 
unfold in and as play does not need to imply that we interpret them in Huizinga’s restrictive and 
esthetic way (cf. Section 4.2) as (innovative) play is also involved in the emergence of less frivolous 
cultural phenomena.
A second important biological function of play is that of fostering social bonds: much play is social 
play. It is that kind of play (as opposed to play in general) that does not have losers and winners (cf. 
Section 4.3). Social play also has flexible as opposed to fixed rules. A key difference between serious 
fights and play fights in animals and children, for example, is that in the latter kind of fights, the 
stronger or better opponent inhibits his or her behavior (self-handicapping): the goal is not to win, the 
goal is to keep the (social) play going. The goal of agonistic games, by contrast, is to win, not to keep 
the play going. Does that mean that these games constitute a bad form of play or even no play at 
all? The middle-of-the-road answer, I believe, is that they are simply one of the almost infinite ways 
in which the strong inclination of human beings to do things just or primarily for fun (the “play in-
stinct”) manifests itself.
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6. Conclusion
The mutual animosity but also influencing between the studia humanitatis and modern science is as 
old as modern science itself. An argument may or may not be made that a non-scientific or human-
ist study of humanity has, in the mean time, become an anachronism, in particular within the con-
fines of modern research universities (Arndt, 2006). I have here tried to show that such a study can, 
in any case, not ignore the insights, gained through the scientific study of the world (epistemic con-
silience) and that the absolute (methodological, epistemic, and vocational) separation between, on 
the one hand, the humanities and, on the other hand, the natural and social sciences that Huizinga 
defended, is untenable.
Homo Ludens can be considered the epitomization of a humanist masterpiece. It struck (and still 
strikes) a nerve because of its eruditeness, attractive literary style, humanism (i.e. the attractive idea 
of man as the playing species), and romantic pessimism. It may not have been (primarily) conceived 
as a truly and objectively explanatory treatise about the role of play in cultures, but that is, inevita-
bly, how it was and is perceived by many of its readers, both inside and outside academia. 
Unfortunately, in this second, explanatory sense, it was anything but a masterpiece. Due to its strong 
play instinct and to the many, myriad ways in which this instinct expresses itself in its behavior, our 
species may indeed be called Homo ludens. However, the credibility of Huizinga’s humanist elabora-
tion of this idea was undermined by his dogmatic belief in a strict separation between the study of 
nature and culture, by his historical pessimism, by a humanist focus on a specific, esthetic part of 
cultures (high culture) and by an equally humanist obsession with one kind of human play (agonistic 
play). Paradoxically, Homo Ludens does not do right to Homo ludens. I have tried to tentatively il-
lustrate that it is only from the very scientific and particularly biological perspective that the arch-
humanist Huizinga detested that we can gain a full and thorough understanding of the importance 
and pluriform meaning that human play, in all its bewildering manifestations, has for our cultures. It 
is in this sense that the case of Homo Ludens exemplifies the need of various forms of (soft) consil-
ience between science and the humanities.
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Notes
1. According to a recent report by Harvard’s Division of 
Arts and Humanities (Mateos, 2013), Bachelor’s degree 
completions in the humanities have, since the late 
1960s, halved in the United States (from 14 to 7% of all 
degrees taken).
2. Else professed, in a contribution (“The old and the new 
humanities”) to a special issue of Daedalus, dedicated to 
the future of the humanities, that the humanities would 
be faced with “increasing confusion and disillusion-
ment” (Else, 1969, p. 808) if they did not succeed in 
bringing their theoretical claims to the position and the 
values that were associated with the old, tightly focused 
humanities curriculum closer together with their more 
mundane contemporary practice, characterized by “a 
diffuse, ‘democratic,’ and relatively passive line, trying 
to be all things to all men” (ibid.). The old humanities 
were characterized by a formative focus on languages 
and the mind. This was not a goal in itself but aimed at 
developing educated judgment and persuasiveness and, 
ultimately, educating the homo politicus: the respon-
sible, politically active citizen, and political leader. It thus 
had moral and political action as its ultimate objective, 
whereas the modern humanities tended to focus “upon 
certain quasi-passive modes of feeling and understand-
ing” (p. 807). A fact of major importance was, further-
more, that in this latest endeavor, they were increasingly 
surpassed and replaced by the social sciences, who 
were, “constantly trying, with increasing success, to be 
more scientific” (ibid.).
3. Pinker points out that this consilience is already a fait 
accompli in archeology, linguistics, and the philosophy 
of mind. Arndt (2006) also gives several examples of 
humanities that have been recast in the mold of the sci-
ences or of attempts to do so: the classics, for example, 
have become largely a branch of philology. Especially 
noteworthy, in this respect, is the “New Humanities” 
program at Binghamton University, jointly conceived 
by the evolutionary biologist David Sloan Wilson and 
Leslie Heywood, a professor of English, and aimed at 
integrating, on the one hand, the humanities and, on 
the other hand, the sciences and in particular evolution-
ary theory and the mechanistic branches of the human 
sciences such as cognitive psychology and neurobiology 
(Wilson & Heywood, 2008). In a similar vein, Gottschall 
(2008) “represents a bold new response to the crisis in 
academic literary studies (…), offers a sweeping critique 
of [dominant] paradigms, and sketches outlines of a 
new paradigm inspired by scientific theories, methods, 
and attitudes.”
4. In 1909, Johannes Andreas (“André”) Jolles, a Dutch-
German poet, art historian, literary scholar, philologist, 
and important correspondent of Huizinga (until he 
joined, in 1933, Hitler’s NSDAP), described Huizinga’s 
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deepest longing as an aiming for “a charming amalgam, 
an electron out of the gold of art and the silver of sci-
ence” (cited in Tollebeek, 2007, p. 201).
5. See, for the influence of his study of Sanskrit and the 
history of Indian culture on his work as a historian of 
the Middle Ages and in particular on The Waning of the 
Middle Ages: Krul (1990, ch. 3).
6. His son, the writer Leonard Huizinga (1963, p. 194), 
likewise had doubts about The Waning and called Homo 
Ludens a masterpiece of construction, thought and 
vision.
7. Logher (1947, p. 102) believed Homo Ludens to be a 
book of “unbelievable erudition.”
8. It is “the hobgoblin of animal behavior, mischievously 
tempting us to succeed in what, judging from the 
number of failed attempts, seems a futile task: defining 
play” (Mitchell, 1990, p. 197). Power (2000, p. 391) 
believes that, “Given its elusive nature, it is unlikely that 
researchers will ever come up with a satisfactory defini-
tion of play.”
9. He thus treated it as a modern cultural anthropologist 
ought to treat it, according to Franz Boas’ interpretation 
of culture and according to his dictum omnis cultura ex 
cultura. The ethnologist, one of Boas’ students declared, 
“will account for a given cultural fact by demonstrating 
some other cultural fact out of which it has developed” 
(quoted in Cravens, 1988, p. 89). Huizinga met Boas and 
many other social scientists during his visit of the United 
States in 1926.
10. He also detested psychology; see in this respect Krul 
(1990, p. 233).
11. Krul (2007, p. 18) nevertheless argues that he did not 
explain the economic roots of the crisis and that he 
clung to the primacy of culture! In a similar vein, the 
celebrated Dutch historian Geyl (1963, p. 245), in a 
critical essay about Huizinga, defined his colleague 
as “the man who wanted us to look upon culture in 
isolation, as an exclusively spiritual process, flourishing 
or declining according to its own rhythm. The man who 
never faced the question as to which political and eco-
nomic factors had raised National Socialism to power, 
nor exactly where.”
12. Burghardt (1997, 2006) adds a fifth aim to Tinbergen’s 
(1963) famous four ethological aims in order to rectify 
the omission of an animal’s “private experience” in the 
study of play: private experience. The fact that play has 
an important mental dimension does indeed not mean 
that it is not a biological phenomenon.
13. Although he does acknowledge that it is nature that 
gave us play. Indeed, “human civilization has added no 
essential feature to the general idea of play. Animals 
play just like men. We have only to watch young dogs 
to see that all the essentials of human play are present 
in the merry gambols” (Huizinga, 1955, p. 1; see, e.g. 
also Dissanayake, 1992: she says exactly the same 
about a play topic par excellence: art). One might 
therefore assume that there indeed exists a natural 
explanation for this behavior. However, Huizinga thinks 
not: the fun of playing “resists all analysis, all logical 
interpretation” (1955, p. 2).
14. Traditional behaviorists and evolutionary biologists, 
from their side, also did not and often still do not 
see play as a biological phenomenon because of the 
same reason that Huizinga believed it to be a topic for 
the humanities: because they believe(d) that “having 
fun” is the defining feature of play and that “fun” is 
impossible to study in animals (Burghardt, 2004). See, 
however, note 12.
15. For Huizinga’s anti-positivism, see Tollebeek (2007, 
ch. 3). It is around this time that Franz Boas and other 
social scientists began to liberate their sciences “from 
the assumptions and models of the natural sciences 
by proclaiming the modern social scientific theory of 
culture” (Cravens, 1988, p. 90).
16. However, it is maybe interesting to point out that the 
biological “understanding” of life also used to be idio-
graphic and speculative-interpretative (idealist). 19th 
century English naturalists, by contrast, “began to view 
their endeavors as nomothetic—oriented toward the 
establishment of general laws—in contrast to the ideo-
graphic impulse (a concern for individual phenomena) 
which dominated their predecessors in the eighteenth 
century” (Rehbock, 1983, p. 7).
17. It should be noted though, that, according to modern 
neo-Darwinism, evolution is largely externally deter-
mined.
18. Scholars still disagree about the question, but there is 
something to be said for the thesis (Wootton, 2015) 
that “science” is a relatively modern invention (17th 
century) and that it is foremost characterized by 
the critical and often experimental investigation or 
“interrogation” of nature, whereas earlier empirical 
observations almost always rather started out from 
preconceived and absolute (i.e. not to be questioned) 
models and theories about nature.
19. The concept “morphology” was very popular in 
contemporary German culture science. As Krul (1990, 
p. 234, note 1) points out: Huizinga must have known 
that it, just like the rejected term “evolution,” origi-
nated in biology. Morphologists study biological forms 
both diachronically (i.e. from an evolutionary perspec-
tive) and synchronically while physiologists primarily 
study biological functions.
20. Dommering (2011) calls Huizinga a phenomenolo-
gist avant la lettre who, in The Waning of the Middle 
Ages, tries to evocate the phenomena, rather than to 
explain them. Nagel (1998) has, in a critical essay on 
Homo Ludens, likewise argued that “Huizinga’s method 
resembles in a striking fashion the phenomenologi-
cal method of Heidegger (…)” (p. 19). He in particular 
shares with the phenomenologists a “predilection 
for an origin (Ursprung!), that is, they emphasize that 
which is original, early or primordial” (p. 20).
21. Thomassen also points out that, in 1938, Huizinga 
became vice-president of one of the League of Nations’ 
organizations: the International Committee of Intel-
lectual Cooperation. His alarm at the rise of fascism 
had already inspired In the Shadow of Tomorrow, A 
Diagnosis of the Spiritual Suffering of Our Times (1936) 
(see also Geschonden Wereld 1946). There are also 
intriguing parallels with the life and work of Norbert 
Elias (who, at the time, was working on his Über den 
Prozeß der Zivilisation, 1939; The Civilizing Process, 
1969–1982). “Both Huizinga and Elias realized the 
urgent need to understand, historically, what was hap-
pening with ‘culture’” (Thomassen, 2014, p. 147).
22. Huizinga indeed was a romantic or “neo-romantic” 
(Geyl, 1963, p. 242). He believed that we still live in the 
Romantic era (see Huizinga, 1950, p. 437) and tried 
to distinguish between a “good” Romanticism and a 
“bad” Romanticism. One escape route for romantics 
was Huizinga’s much beloved Middle Ages, “the same 
epoch that the Enlightenment despised as the Dark 
Ages and attacked as an era of superstition and clerical 
tyranny” (Herman, 1997, p. 48). Another escape route 
was, of course, Orientalism. The philosopher Friedrich 
Schlegel “proclaimed that ‘it is in the Orient that we 
must seek the highest Romanticism’” (Herman, 1997, 
p. 49). Leonard also called his father a romantic (see 
Huizinga, 1963, p. 24). Gombrich (1973, p. 285) points 
out that “the romantic aestheticism he had always 
tried to keep under strict control [eventually] offered 
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itself as the only refuge from the modern world from 
which he felt increasingly alienated.” It is probably 
more correct to say that it was his Romanticism that 
caused him to feel increasingly alienated from the 
modern world (see, in this respect, Gombrich, 1973,  
p. 289). Sutton-Smith (1997, p. 136) speaks, in connec-
tion with Homo Ludens, of a “romantic nostalgia for 
the primitive and for childhood (…).”
23. Nagel (1998, p. 21) writes that Huizinga’s purpose in 
treating play as a cultural phenomenon is precisely to 
restrict the study “to the aesthetic quality of play.”
24. In the preface, Huizinga points out that his hosts in 
Zürich, Vienna and London wanted to change the title 
of his lecture “The play element of culture” in “The play 
element in culture.” Each time, he protested and clung 
to the genitive because it was not his object to define 
the place of play among all the other manifestations 
of culture but rather to ascertain how far culture itself 
bears the character of play. The latter title may indeed 
have been more appropriate.
25. In Over de Grenzen van Spel en Ernst in de Cultuur 
(1940), he called this (“a contest about something”) 
the third feature of play. It was maybe even more 
important than the two first features (a stepping out 
of real life and a demonstration of something), even 
though it was not always present.
26. Huizinga repeatedly referred to this article as one of his 
sources of inspiration, see Krul (1990, p. 225, note 4).
27. The title of his New York Times obituary read: “Brian 
Sutton-Smith, Scholar of What’s Fun, Dies at 90.”
28. For a critical analysis of this idea, see Shea (1989). 
Certain features, such as our long legs, seem to be in 
contradiction with the neoteny notion: some of our 
adult features are neotenous, others are not.
29. Huizinga gives a particularly nasty example of “playful” 
sadism in The Waning of the Middle Ages: “The people 
of Bruges, in 1488, cannot get their fill of seeing the 
tortures inflicted, on a high platform in the middle of 
the market-place, on the magistrates suspected of 
treason. The unfortunates are refused the death-blow 
which they implore, that the people may feast again, 
upon their torments” (Huizinga, 1924, p. 15).
30. This idea is of course not completely new. Power (2000, 
p. 289), for example, observes that the major forms of 
social object play, identified in humans (sociodramatic 
play and games with rules) appear to be uniquely 
human and are apparent consequences of symbolic, 
communicative, and other cognitive abilities.
31. Gombrich (1973, p. 293) made in this respect an 
interesting remark: “The fact that the boat of the Cam-
bridge crew arrives at the winning post before that of 
Oxford is taken to mean that Cambridge is the better 
University. I confess I suffer from a rare disability in this 
respect. I find it hard to understand the feeling that 
‘we have won’ merely because someone has won.”
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